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Plan of the Book and Summary of Findings
IN BROAD terms this report presents analytical materials to meet the
dual objective of describing and appraising (I) the flow of residential
mortgage funds in the post-World War II decade and the main underlying
influences, and (2) the institutional framework of the residential mortgage
market in terms of lender policies and practices, and market techniques
and characteristics. To the task of meeting these objectives, the study
brings evaluations of a variety of information already available and
development of new information, both statistical and qualitative.
Plan of the Book
The report is organized around the relatively simple plan of describing
at the outset what happened during the first postwar decade in the
area under investigation and then appraising the main factors responsible
for changes. Chapter 2 sets the stage by describing the special position
of mortgage debt in the economy at the end of the war, the record volume
of mortgage flows in the succeeding decade, and the resulting marked
changes in that debt structure at the end of the period. In Chapter 3
the broad setting in which changes occurred and the main elements
underlying mortgage market expansion and restraint are appraised in
a time-sequence oriented analysis. The factors include the position of
financial institutions, capital market conditions, monetary and fiscal
policies; federal mortgage programs, and demands for mortgage funds.
Because the yield relationships among capital market securities are such a
basic determinant of the flow-of-funds pattern and because so little is
known about the postwar movement of mortgage interest rates, both are
singled out for separate exploration in Chapter 4.It is left for Chapter 5
to tie more closely together and in considerable detail the changes in
postwar mortgage flows, by type of mortgage and type of lender, and their
basic underlying causes. There the attempt is to put together the market
structure analysis of Chapter 2 and the time-sequence analysis of
Chapter 3.
Chapters 6 and 7 shift the emphasis away from the statistical orientation
of mortgage flow analysis to the institutional setting of the market place.
The analysis in both chapters is more qualitative than quantitative and is
concerned basically with differences in mortgage investment policies and
practices of the main types of financial institutions, and with the special
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organization, techniques, and characteristics that distinguish the mortgage
market frOm other sectors of the capital market. Chapter 7 is directed
toward an appraisal of the more interesting new postwar market develop-
ments which have sprung up in response to shifting financial conditions,
and the basic organizational arrangements of primary and secondary
markets including junior mortgage financing. Chapter 8 is a summary of a
previously published occasional paper' and shows how a new type of
financial institution—the modern mortgage company—has developed to
meet the needs of new institutional arrangements of the postwar mortgage
market.
Within that framework of analysis, the reader will find a considerable
body of new quantitative and qualitative information. The statistical
orientation towards flow-of-funds accounts is supported by more corn-
prehertsive data on net mortgage flows than was previously available,
for both time intervals and type of mortgage and lender.2 Given the
well-known limitations of net flows data, the more comprehensive series
has facilitated and made more meaningful the analysis of postwar
mortgage market developments. The analysis has been aided also by
new annual and quarterly series on conventional mortgage interest rates,
developed in this study.While not as broadly based as desired, these
series illuminate a previously dark area and permit new insights into
comparative interest rate movements.
The two chapters on mortgage lending policies and market techniques
are founded in large part on evaluation of primary information obtained
by direct personal interviews with representatives of a variety ofinstitutions
and with individuals associated with the mortgage market. In addition
to the broad qualitative information obtained, savings and loan associa-
tions supplied some new data through questionnaires that—though subject
to qualification—tell us a little more about their lending practices than we
knew before. The appraisal of the role of mortgage companies in the
postwar residential mortgage market is based entirely on new data
developed in this study.
The summary of the study's findings to which we now turn must
necessarily be brief.Results will often be reported without supporting
evidence or reference to underlying causes.For expanded discussion
the reader must rely upon the pertinent chapters which follow. The
analysis of "yield differentials and gross mortgage flows," (page 13), is an
1SaulB. Kiaman, The Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies, Occasional Paper 60,
New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959.
Kiaman, The Volume of Mortgage Debt in the Postwar Decade, Technical Paper 13,
New York, NBER, 1958.
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exception to the general summary presentations in this chapter.It is
discussed more fully than in later chapters because expansion of earlier
drafts and development of more recent data could be included here more
conveniently.
Summary of Findings
POSTWAR CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF MORTGAGE DEBT
At the war's end, the relative importance of mortgage debt in the nation's
economic and financial structure had declined to a point lower than in
almost any year as far back as the turn of the century. The absolute
level of mortgage debt, as well as its structure, was little different at
the end of World War II than at its beginning. From the relatively
depressed postwar starting point, mortgage debt more than quadrupled in
the subsequent years through 1956, and that unusually rapid growth was
accompanied by marked changes in the structure and organization of
mortgage markets. Between 1945 and 1956 major shifts occurred in the
relative significance of real estate properties securing mortgage debt, in
types of mortgages outstanding (conventional and federally underwritten),
in the types of market participants, and in the portfolio composition of
major lenders.
The net flow of funds into nonfarm mortgage markets, in the 1946—
1956 period, was markedly larger than the flow into any other sector of
the money or capital markets.It amounted to one-third of the total net
flow of funds into all types of debt instruments, and was greater than
the combined flow into corporate and state and local government
securities.Within mortgage markets, mortgages on one- to four-family
houses absorbed three-fourths of the entire net flow of funds. One-half of
the home mortgage flow was in conventional mortgages, the other half in
federally underwritten. Of the latter type, the largest part was guaranteed
by the Veterans Administration. The rate of expansion in VA-guaranteed
mortgages was far greater than in other types of mortgage debt, reflecting
in part the small volume outstanding at the end of
The chief sources of postwar mortgage funds have been the four main
types of financial institutions—life insurance companies, savings and loan
associations, commercial banks, and mutual savings banks—which together
supplied five-sixths of the total volume. The first two types of institutions
alone accounted for more than half the total net mortgage flow. Among
the four, savings and loan associations dominated the market for conven-
tional home mortgages, mutual savings banks the market for multifamily
The VA mortgage guarantee program had been operating only a short time by the
end of 1945, having been authorized by the Servicemen's Readjustment Act in June 1944.
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mortgages, and life insurance companies and commercial banks the market
for nonresidential mortgages. Of the other types of financial institutions
separately identified in the statistics given here, only mortgage companies
accounted for as much as 1 per cent of the net mortgage supply. Their role
is that of mortgage originators and servicers, however, rather than inves-
tors, and is unique among mortgage market participants. Nonfinancial
institutions, federal agencies, and individuals together were a relatively
minor source of total mortgage funds in the postwar decade, but they were
individually significant in particular markets. Nonfinancial institutions
were a dominant supplier in the farm mortgage market and were an
important source of nonfarm nonresidential mortgage funds as well.
By far the largest demands for mortgage funds, among all identifiable
economic groups, were from consumers borrowing chiefly to finance the
purchase of new and existing houses. Net mortgage borrowing by that
group amounted to more than two-thirds of all mortgage funds borrowed
in the first postwar decade, and was two and a half times the amount
borrowed by all nonfarm businesses—the second largest group. The post-
war demand for mortgage funds from farm businesses and from nonprofit
organizations was relatively small.
By the end of 1956, following more than a decade of rapid but uneven
expansion in mortgage markets, fundamental changes had occurred in
the structure of mortgage debt. Two-thirds of the debt was secured by
one- to four-family properties compared with one-half at the end of the
war. Accompanying that sharp increase, debt secured by each of the other
types of property declined substantially in relative importance. Within the
home mortgage sector, VA-guaranteed debt increased extraordinarily,
from 1 per cent of the total at the end of 1945 to 28 per cent, while Federal
Housing Administration insured mortgage debt was shrinking from 22 to
16 per cent, and conventional loans from 77 to 56 per cent of the total.
Ownership of the mortgage debt, already fairly concentrated at the end
of the war, was even more so by the end of 1956, with over three-fourths
held by the four main types of financial intermediaries, compared with less
than three-fifths eleven years earlier.Savings and loan associations in-
creased their participation in mortgage markets relatively more, and
savings b'anks relatively less, than the other types of institutions.
Postwar changes in mortgage markets were reflected also in the
changing composition of mortgage portfolios of major lenders.Savings
and loan associations, while continuing to concentrate their activities
in conventional home mortgages, markedly increased the proportion of
their holdings in VA-guaranteed loans.Life insurance companies and
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savings banks sharply increased their holdings of home mortgage loans.
Savings banks expanded their VA loans to one-third of their total
mortgage portfolio, a larger proportion than any other type of loan.
Commercial banks expanded their home mortgage holdings somewhat
less sharply than either of the latter two institutions and, unlike them,
continued to maintain the same proportion of their loans in nonresidential
mortgages.
As to liability for mortgage debt, after a decade of record borrowing
consumers owed three-fifths of the total amount of mortgage debt out-
standing in 1956, nearly twice that owe4 by nonfarm businesses. At the
end of the war each of these sectors had owed about the same amount of
mortgage debt—a little over two-fifths of the total. Farmers and nonprofit
organizations continued to owe relatively small amounts of mortgage debt
at the end of 1956.
PATTERN OF MORTGAGE FLOWS AND UNDERLYING INFLUENCES
The summary of broad postwar changes in mortgage debt and flows
obscures the wide fluctuations within mortgage market sectors and the
varying relationships among them. The swings occurred in response
to changes in economic and financial activity and in governmental actions.
During the first half of the decade the interplay of those factors brought
about almost unrestrained expansion in mortgage markets. There were
insistent demands for mortgage credit to finance the increasing volume of
new construction and real estate transactions at rising prices.Financial
institutions with large holdings of government securities were unusually
liquid and were actively seeking new and more profitable investment
outlets. The Federal Reserve System's policy of supporting government
bond pricesat par—and therefore at relatively constant and low
yields—permitted institutions to sell such securities readily and without
penalty. The federal government, moreover, in its efforts to stimulate
production of housing, was aggressively pursuing a policy of liberalizing
Fl-IA and VA mortgage programs and expanding the secondary market
authority of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). All
these elements contributed to the attractiveness to investors of mortgage
yields relative to those of other capital market securities through most of
the 1946—1950 period. Federally underwritten mortgages had the added
advantage of limited risk.
In that setting the flow of funds into mortgages increased almost without
interruption, culminating in 1950 in a record volume not exceeded until
four years later. In most years of the first half-decade the mortgage flow
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was larger than the combined flow into other capital market securiiies;
for the period as a whole it was three-fourths larger than the net issue of
corporate securities and three times larger than that of state and municipal
securities. All major types of savings institutions—mutual savings banks,
life insurance companies, savings and loan associations—invested an
increasing proportion of their assets in mortgages from 1946 through
1950.
Commercial banks committed a considerably larger proportion of their
investment funds to mortgages in the first three postwar years than in the
succeeding two, representing conversion of a heavy share of their extra-
ordinarily large volume of government securities. In 1947 and 1948 the
net flow of mortgage from commercial banks was larger than from
any other type of investor.
Mutual savings banks and life insurance companies were slower than
commercial banks to take advantage of favorable investment opportunities.
Savings banks were handicapped by legal restrictions limiting mortgage
acquisitions generally to their own or adjoining states. Since most savings
banks are located in the East where construction and real estate markets
were relatively inactive, legally eligible mortgage loans were not plentiful
in the immediate postwar years. When state laws were modified to permit
acquisition of FHA and VA loans throughout the country, savings banks
increased their mortgage lending markedly, absolutely and also in relation
to other investments.
The relatively slow pickup of mortgage investments by life insurance
companies was due in part to the Cautious attitude Qf some Companies
remembering the experience of the thirties and in part to problems of
market reorganization.It was necessary to re-establish mortgage corre-
spondent or branch office organizations, largely dismantled after many
years of reduced mortgage activity during depression and war. As these
problems were solved and skepticism towards mortgages faded, life in-
surance companies devoted a steadily rising share of assets to mortgages.
Except for the first two years after the war, when commercial banks took
the lead in mortgage lending, the net flow of funds from life insurance
companies exceeded the flow from any other type of investor through 1951.
Savings and loan associations liquidated about $1 billion in government
securities and placed all their capital investments in mortgages during
the 1946—1950 period.Even so, the reduced inflow of savings limited
their absolute volume to less than that of commercial banks in the first
part of the period, and to less than that of life insurance companies
in the latter part.
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The total mortgage flow from the four types of financial institutions—
comprising the bulk of available mortgage funds in each year of the
decade—varied with market conditions from a little over three-fourths
to nearly nine-tenths of the total. The low occurred during 1949 following
a general rise in bond yields and a slight business recession. As institutional
funds were attracted to other markets, support for federally underwritten
mortgages was provided by FNMA, whose purchasing authority had
been expanded in 1948 to include VA loans and had been generally
liberalized by the Housing Act of 1948. This support was not sufficient,
however, to prevent a decline in over-all net mortgage flows during
1949—the only year of decline in the first half of the postwar decade.
The decrease, reflecting both reduced demand and relatively unfavorable
yields, was mainly in the market for one- to four-family mortgage loans,
with some drop also in the flow of nonresidential mortgage funds. The
1949 flow of funds into multifamily mortgages, however, increased from
earlier very iow levels, owing entirely to the stimulation of the FHA
Title VI program. Through it, construction and financing of rental
housing had become both profitable and riskiess.
The marked economic expansion of 1950, accompanied by further
liberalization of government mortgage programs and declines in yields
on competitive securities, brought forth a sharply increased flow of
mortgage funds. Evidence of the renewed attractiveness of mortgages to
financial intermediaries was their provision of a larger proportion of the
increased net flow of mortgage funds in 1950—87 per cent—than in any
other year on record.All types of financial institutions increased their
participation in mortgage markets during that unusually active year of
business and mortgage activity.
Within home mortgage markets, the composition of mortgage flows
fluctuated widely. In the first half-decade, the flow of funds into federally
underwritten mortgages exceeded that into conventional; in the latter half,
the reverse was true. Within the federally underwritten sector, the move-
ments of VA and FRA mortgage flows often diverged because of the effects
of basic differences in federal programs and of lender reactions to them.
In general, VA financing has tended to fluctuate more widely and irregu-
larly than that of FHA, and both have been far less stable than conventional
financing. The relative stability of conventional mortgage flows has been
due largely to the flexibility of conventional interest rates compared with
relatively rigid maximum interest rates on federally underwritten loans.
During the 1948—1949 rise in bond yields, for example, VA mortgage flows
declined rapidly, accounting for nearly all of the drop in home mortgage
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flows. A sharp rise followed in 1950—195!, accompanying the easing in
bond yields and the general economic expansion. FHA mortgage flows
showed little change during most of that period, however. The markedly
different behavior of the VA and FHA loan programs in those years is
explained by differences in contract interest rates, in amounts of loan
guarantee and insurance,in mortgage terms, in secondary market
support, and in availability of special incentive programs for builders and
lenders. The influence of these and other factors is evaluated in Chapters 3
to5.
Underlying the changing composition of home mortgage flows were
shifts in the participation of both private financial institutions and FNMA
in the various markets. The main shifts among participants occurred
in the market for VA loans. In the market for FHA loans, life insurance
companies were the dominant lenders throughout the first half-decade;
and in the conventional loan market, savings and loan associations led.
In the second half-decade, life insurance companies relinquished their
dominance of the FHA market to commercial banks and mutual savings
banks. In the VA loan market, savings and loan associations and commer-
cial banks were the leading lenders in the immediate postwar years, as life
insurance companies and mutual savings banks delayed entering it, for
reasons previously noted. In the 1950—1951 mortgage expansion, however,
life insurance companies accounted for almost the entire VA loan growth,
having firmly established their correspondent organizations and finding
these loans attractive relative to other investments.
The strong support provided for the VA loan market by FNMA,
following the expansion of its authority in 1948 to include that sector3
is indicated by the fact that the Association provided funds for more than
one-third of all VA mortgage flows in 1949, a larger proportion than any
private lender. Strong FNMA support continued in 1950 even after many
private lenders expanded their participation in VA markets. The Associ-
ation's role in FHA loan markets, though important, was relatively far less
significant than in VA loan markets.
Following the outbreak of war in Korea in mid-1950 and the Federal
Reserve-Treasury "accord" in March 1951, there was an abrupt change
in the capital market setting. This resulted in marked shifts in the flow
of mortgage funds relative to other financial flows and within the various
mortgage market sectors. Direct post-Korean federal controls tended to
restrain mortgage lending activity for nearly three years. Though not
measurable, these restraints probably were not as great as those resulting
from restrictive monetary policies, alternative investment opportunities,
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and reduced liquidity of financial institutions. In any case, direct federal
restrictions were removed by mid-1953, and mortgage markets alternately
expanded and contracted in response to shifting monetary policies, changes
in general capital market demands, and federal legislative and adminis-
trative actions. The alternate expansion and contraction in the 195 1—1956
period was in marked contrast to the almost uninterrupted expansion of
the preceding five years.
Notwithstanding the introduction of important restraining forces, the net
flow of mortgage funds in each year of the 195 1—1956 period continued to
exceed other individual capital market flows by a wide margin. The margin
narrowed considerably during the 195 1—1953 period of credit restraint,
widened thereafter through 1955, and declined again in 1956 as restraining
forces once again became dominant. During periods of general contraction
the four main types of financial institutions reduced their mortgage market
participation relatively more than other lenders did, while in periods of
expansion they increased their mortgage activity relatively more than other
lenders did.
The greater volatility in the one- to four-family than in other mortgage
sectors, clearly revealed in this study, is due entirely to the impact of shift-
ing market forces on the flow of federally underwritten mortgage funds.
As in the first half-decade, the fluctuation of the flow of VA funds was con-
siderably greater than that of FHA funds, but more in degree than in
direction of change. During the 195 1—1953 period of Regulation X and
associated federal controls, restrictive monetary policy, rising bond yields,
and reduced FNMA authority, the drop in the flow of VA mortgage funds
was sharper than in FHA funds.Subsequently, in the changed capital
market environment of 1953—1955-—mortgage credit restrictions removed,
monetary policy eased, bond yields in decline, FHA and VA contract
rates raised, and FNMA's purchasing authority increased—VA
mortgage flows expanded much more sharply than FHA flows. Again, the
to restraint in 1955—1956 had a greater impact on VA markets. All
of this suggests that investors find the quality and terms of VA loans less
attractive than those of FHA loans; that, in comparison with their reaction
to FHA markets, they withdraw from VA markets faster when other invest-
ment çpportunities are favorable and return with more volume when other
opportunities diminish.
data developed in this study clearly reveal that changes
in mortgage market activity lag behind the events that induce or influence
them. The increase in VA lending activity, for example, did not start
until mid-1954 following the return of expansionary forces in late 1953.
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VA flows continued sharply upward through 1955 after restraining forces
had already become dominant; the reaction to restraint was not evident
in VA mortgage flows until early 1956. The lag in the upturn of FHA
mortgage flows was somewhat longer than in VA flows, and the lag in the
downturn was about the same. Quarterly data on conventional mortgage
flows must be used more carefully in drawing inferences because of
recurring and fluctuating movements that stem principally from seasonal
activity of savings and loan associations. Nevertheless, time lags are still
evident, with the upturn during 1954 sharper and longer than usual to a
third-quarter peak, and the downturn in late 1955 greater than usual to a
fourth-quarter low.Earlier, during 1952 and 1953, when federally
underwritten mortgage flows were declining, conventional mortgage flows
increased, as interest rates were free to rise with those on other capital
market securities.
PATTERN OF MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES
Lack of comprehensive data has limited empirical evidence on the course
of mortgage interest rates and yields in the postwar decade.The
development in this study of quarterly contract interest rate series on
conventional home and income property mortgage loans closed by life
insurance companies permits us now to draw some general conclusions
on the movement of conventional mortgage interest rates.First, the
amplitude of home mortgage interest rate movements has been consider-
ably narrower than rate movements of other capital market securities.
Second, changes in home mortgage interest rates have consistently lagged
by about four quarters behind changes in bond yields. Third, broad move-
ments in mortgage interest rates and bond yields have been in general
conformity reflecting the pervasive influence of conditions in financial
markets.Fourth, interest rates on conventional mortgages secured by
income properties have been generally lower and somewhat more volatile
than rates on conventional home mortgages. The summary findings,
which tend to confirm those reported in earlier National Bureau studies
of the first half of this century, are supported and evaluated in Chapter 4.
As for FHA and VA interest rates, their inflexibility has been an impor-
tant factor in the volatility of federally underwritten mortgage flows. The
technique of market discounts has been only partially effective during
periods of credit stringency in adjusting maximum rates on these loans—
established by law or regulation—to yields competitive with other capital
market securities. The failure of that expedient reflects the legal restrictions
and complexities associated with the use of discounts and also strong
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Congressional criticism, particularly when discounts are large and increas-
ing. As a result, many financial institutions have become unwilling to lend
on federally underwritten mortgages when yields on competitive securities
are rising.
Yield
aclear relationship between changing capital market yields and
FHA and VA mortgage flows. This relationship is reflected in Chart 1,
which compares gross VA and FHA mortgage flows with differentials
between yields on new high-grade corporate bond issues and VA and FHA
contract interest rates.It is apparent that changes in both VA and FHA
gross flows generally lag behind changes in yield differentials, and that VA
loans are somewhat more responsive than FHA loans to such changes.
The lack of close conformity between gross flows and yield spreads in each
year is explained partly by the influence of other factors appraised in
Chapter 3 and partly by imperfections in the data.
The influence of yield spreads on gross flows has been particularly
evident since mid-1953, which marked the end of selective control of real
estate credit through Regulation X and associated regulations. There-
after, the ebb and flow of VA and FHA mortgage funds followed the
diminishing and increasing spreads between federally underwritten con-
tract interest rates and flexible yields on directly competitive new Aaa
corporate bond issues. A similar pattern emerges when the comparison
is made between government bond yields and FHA and VA interest rates.
The sharp rise in yield spreads to a postwar high in 1954 was followed
by a rapid rise in VA mortgage flows to a record peak in late 1955. The
subsequent almost uninterrupted decline in yield spreads from the end
of 1954 through late 1957, as corporate yields advanced sharply, was
followed bya precipitous drop in VA flows to a postwar low by mid-1958.
The turnaround and marked rise in VA flows thereafter reflected the earlier
easing in financial markets and the significant widening in the differential
between new bond yields and VA contract rates (Chart 1).
It was the FHA market that responded quickly to yield changes in
1957—1958 as contract interest rates on FHA loans were increased from 5
to 5* per cent in August 1957. The rate on VA loans, meanwhile, was
maintained atper cent, until the spring of 1958 when it was raised
toper cent.The more attractive rate on FHA loans relative to
corporate bonds, evident from Chart 1, was largely responsible for the
marked upturn in FHA mortgage flows after mid-1957 while VA flows
































Data on gross mortgage flow are quarterly averages of monthly figures from the
Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration. The series on average
yields of new corporate bond issues used for comparison with FHA and VA loans is from
the First National City Bank of New York; it begins in 1951 and is adjusted to an Aaa
basis. This yield series was used because it pertains to securities competitive with FHA and
VA loans and because it is more responsive to market change than yield series on out-
standing corporate bonds. By the same token, data on gross rather than net mortgage
flows were used because they reflect more quickly the response of lenders to changes in
financial markets.
A similar comparison with conventional mortgage loans is precluded because of the lack
of quarterly data on gross mortgage flows. Comparison of yield differentials with esti.
mated annual conventional mortgage flows reveals much narrower changes than in the
FHA and VA loan series, as noted in several places in the text. See Table A-i below.
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CHART I
Comparison of FHA and VA Gross Mortgage Flows with Differentials
between Contract Interest Rates on FHA and VA Mortgages and Yields
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FHA and VA contract interest rates were the same, FHA mortgage flows
responded more tardily and less sharply than VA flows to changes in yield
differentials.4
Even when contract interest rates on FHA and VA loans were estab-
lished at the same level, market prices for FHA loans were consistently
higher and yields lower—in part because of the relative differences in
quality attributed to each by investors.Interest rates on conventional
home loans were generally higher than yields on federally underwritten
mortgages throughout the postwar decade (Chapter 4). The spread tended
to narrow somewhat when capital markets were tightening in late 1953
and again in late 1955. The amount of spread was due not only to the
existence of government guarantees but also to differences in contract
terms. The evidence suggests that the market place does not regard VA
and FHA loans as riskless assets, but rather applies traditional standards
of quality with regard to mortgage terms and underlying properties in
judging the values of those investments.
Regional Yield Variation.s
A fundamental difference between markets where mortgages are issued
and traded and markets where other securities are involvedisthat
the former are primarily local and the latter are national.While
the interregional flow of mortgage funds has increased sharply since the
advent of federal mortgage insurance and guarantee, regional yield vari-
ations have persisted. Limited data suggest, for example, that in 1956 yields
on VA mortgages available in Philadelphia were about 50 basis points
higher than in Los Angeles. That variation was not much smaller than
that reported for conventional mortgage yields in 1940. The arbitrage
process clearly limits the spread in regional mortgage yields.But it
isdoubtful that regional yield differentials will soon be eliminated
because mortgages are tied to local real estate values; they are inextricably
linked to local market developments, to local foreclosure and other real
estate laws, and to other peculiarly local economic, social, and political
factors. Other more specific reasons for the persistence of mortgage yield
differentials by geographic region are suggested in Chapter 4.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF MORTGAGE MARKETS
Postwar changes in mortgage debt and markets and the influences under-
lying those changes can be appreciated more easily in the context of the
Inclusion of data for 1957 and 1958 in this analysis of yield spreads and mortgage
flows is a pre-publication revision, not practicable for the whole study, which covers the
years 1945—1956.
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institutional framework in which those changes took place. Among im-
portant interrelated aspects of the institutional framework of postwar mort-
gage markets are: fundamental differences in mortgage lending policies
and practices of major financial institutions; development of new tech-
niques and characteristics in mortgage market operation; relationships
between primary and secondary markets and their changing significance;
and characteristics of the market for junior mortgage financing. These
subjects are dealt with in Chapters 6 to 8, which are summarized briefly in
the remainder of this chapter.
Mortgage Lending Policies and Practices
The major postwar suppliers of mortgage funds differ strikingly in their
lending policies and practices. Not only are there basic variations among
the types of institutions, but also among individual institutions of the same
type. Life insurance companies, for example, are guided in their mortgage
operations by a set of factors different from those guiding savings banks or
savings and loan associations, but there are also basic operational differences
among life insurance companies.
Life insurance companies have a wide degree of investment flexibility
and are guided in their choice of investments mainly by yield differentials.
Other basic factors influence the volume of their mortgage flows, such as
personal biases of investment officers, mortgage correspondent relation-
ships, and the ratio of mortgage loans to assets. Stable and efficient corre-
spondent organizations, which acquire and service mortgages outside the
home office states, are regarded as valuable assets. Many life insurance
companies—chiefly the larger ones—that have such assets are committed
to basic minimum mortgage programs, regardless of changes in mortgage
yields. Companies that have established a branch office system to acquire
and service mortgages are similarly committed to a minimum mortgage
investment program. The degree of expansion beyond what are regarded
as irreducible mortgage flows, however, is determined by relative yields in
various investment sectors. Upper and lower limits of mortgage expansion
and contraction for some companies are adjusted in line with intermediate
and longer-range goals of suitable ratios of mortgage loans to total assets.
The goals are reviewed periodically and changed as new market circum-
stances are discerned. The notion of limiting one type of investment to a
"desirable" ratio reflects a basic policy ofdiversification. Other companies,
chiefly smaller ones, often disregard the idea of ratios and diversification
and vary mortgage flows solely according to changes in relative yield.
Smaller companies are also less concerned than larger companies are about
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correspondent or branch office organizations and hence operate with a
greater degree of flexibility in mortgage markets.
Wide variations characterize the residential mortgage lending operations
of life insurance companies, but as a group they are better adapted to
permanent, long-term financing of large housing projects rather than of
single properties. Lending on large-scale income properties is also wide-
spread among life insurance companies. Though closely associated with
the construction process, life insurance companies generally do not extend
short-term credits directly.This type of lending would be inconsistent
with the nature of their business and investment needs.
In their mortgage lending operations, the larger life insurance com-
panies typically operate through the allocation and commitment process.
Many plan their operations a year or more ahead, allocating funds to
correspondents and committing themselves to accept completed mortgages
upon delivery or within a stated time.This type of operation clearly
limits flexibility in the short run but eases the problems of keeping large
aggregations of funds fully invested over the business cycle. Many large
companies are willing to forego the short-run maximization of yields in
favor of a long-range program of continuity of operations. The technique,
however, gives rise to other basic problems:the uncertain time lags
between allocations, commitments, and disbursements of funds;the
uncertain rate of attrition in commitments; and the danger of being
overcommitted relative to premium and other inflows if market conditions
change. Smaller companies that are not so heavily committed to mortgage
programs and to the system of fund allocations to correspondents and
branch offices probably enjoy flexibility in greater degree than larger
companies.
Investment outlets of mutual savings banks are more limited than those
of life insurance companies or commercial banks, but less limited than
those of savings and loan associations.Savings banks have tended to
choose, within the legal list of investments available to them, those
bearing the highest yields commensurate with risk.In most of the first
postwar decade, that policy resulted in acquisition of available mortgages
in the maximum amounts consistent with deposit inflows and statutory
requirements. In their mortgage lending programs, savings banks have
operated traditionally in local markets as long-term residential mortgage
lenders. Since 1950, when most savings bank states amended their statutes
to permit investment in out-of-state federally underwritten mortgages,
these mutual institutions have become important national mortgage len-
ders as well. The granting of authority to purchase out-of-state mortgages
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was probably the most significant single factor influencing the postwar
mortgage lending policies of mutual savings banks. But the expanded
opportunities brought increased legal and organizational problems. In
acquiring out-of-state mortgages, some savings banks patterned their opera-
tions after those of life insurance companies (though legal restrictions
concerning "foreign corporations" prohibited a true investor-correspon-
dent relationship). As a result, these savings banks have been faced with
problems similar to those of life insurance companies with correspondent
relationships—problems associated with the long-range commitments
process. Partly for this reason other savings banks have preferred in the
main to acquire out-of-state mortgages, which have been and are ready
for immediate delivery.
Aside from problems of mortgage acquisition techniques, savings banks
with an uncertain volume of deposit inflows can hardly plan their mort-
gage programs so far ahead as life insurance companies with their more
predictable premium income. For purposes of internal planning, the banks
allocate funds for mortgages on the basis of minimum expected net deposits
and mortgage repayments.Programs are under constant review and
revision as changes develop in deposit and other cash inflows and in
market conditions. A wider degree of short-run program flexibility than
most life insurance companies have is afforded by absence of permanent
organizational arrangements with mortgage originators 'and, for many
banks, by acquisition of mortgages in the secondary market for immediate
delivery.
Compared with other major financial institutions in the mortgage
market, savings and loan associations are singularly limited by law and
tradition to the specialized role of home mortgage lenders.In home
mortgage markets they specialize, also, in providing conventional loans
directly to individual borrowers in local markets and thus are less flexible
than other financial institutions in adjusting investment programs to
changes in capital market conditions. Changes in their mortgage flows,
therefore, signify changes in their savings inflows, in their ability to
borrow from Federal Home Loan Banks, and in their competitive position
among other lenders rather than shifts to and from other investment
markets.
While engaged primarily in providing long-term permanent mortgage
funds directly to home buyers, the associations have also become important
suppliers of short-term construction funds to builders—usually with the
intent of acquiring the permanent mortgage loans on completed properties.
A significant number of their construction loans, however, has been
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refinanced as permanent mortgage loans by other lenders, according to
information obtained in a survey made for this study (see Chapter 6).
Whether or not the original purpose of such construction loans was to
obtain the permanent mortgage financing, the ultimate effect has been
that of short-term construction financing.
In their permanent mortgage financing activities, savings and loan
associations, in addition to dominating the conventional home mortgage
market, have supplied a large volume of VA mortgage funds.That
volume was about as large over the full postwar decade as the volume
supplied by each of the other major financial intermediaries, and in the
early years of the decade the associations were the largest source of such
mortgage funds. The frequently noted indifference of savings and loan
associations to federally underwritten mortgages, therefore, applies only
to FHA-insured loans.While there are many individual exceptions,
the savings and loan industry as a whole has provided little support
to the FHA mortgage insurance program since its inception in 1931a
situation that may change in the years ahead, particularly if the VA
guarantee program is allowed to expire.
Among the four major types of financial intermediaries, commercial
banks play the most varied role in mortgage markets. Some banks limit
their participation to short-term construction loans, others to indirect
interim financing credits ("warehousing"), and still others to long-term
permanent mortgages. Some commercial banks, of course, provide more
than one of these types of financing, while others do not participate at all
in real estate financing. In general, the smaller country banks are more
actively engaged in permanent mortgage financing and the large city
banks in construction and interim financing.
Even among larger banks construction financing is concentrated among
the relatively few that have acquired experience in that highly specialized,
complex, and lucrative operation. Before extending construction credit,
the commercial bank typically requires a firm "take-out" commitment
from another financial institution by which it agrees to provide the per-
manent mortgage financing. In the later part of the postwar decade, the
"standby" commitment was often used to back up Construction loans when
regular take-out commitments were not readily available (see Chapter 7
for discussion of standby commitments).
The most common of the techniques for extending construction loans
is that used by most large New York money market banks, which operate
through correspondent banks in various parts of the country.The
function of a correspondent bank is to place and service the loans, toward
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which it provides about 10 per cent of the funds, 90 per cent coming
from the money market bank. To the large New York bank, the gross
return has ranged between 5 andper cent, but to the correspondent
bank the return has been around 10 per cent.That return includes
earnings not only on its contribution to the construction loan but also a
share of the return on the balance provided by the parent bank.
Interim credits (so-called warehousing) to mortgage lenders have long
been extended by commercial banks. This type of financing, used princi-
pally by mortgage companies, bridges the gap between the completion of
the mortgage loan and its delivery to principal investors. Interim credits
enable the companies to carry mortgage inventories far larger than their
own resources would permit. Variations and extensions of interim finan-
cing in the postwar decade, discussed in Chapter 7, have at times tended
to introduce a note of instability into the mortgage market. The volume
of interim financing provided by commercial banks increased sharply
during the postwar years in response to changes in market conditions and
operating techniques, and to demands of mortgage companies, whose
operations are vitally dependent upon interim financing.
The story of the growth and change in mortgage company operations
during the postwar decade is one of the most interesting and important
developments in the institutional setting of mortgage markets. A brief
account, more fully presented in The Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies
is given in Chapter 8.Mortgage companies originate and service mort-
gage loans for the accounts of institutional investors, not for their own
portfolios, and usually engage in one or more related real estate activities.
Relative to their volume of business, mortgage companies have a very
small capital investment. Their phenomenal growth is directly connected
with the introduction of the federal mortgage underwriting program and
its reduction of geographic barriers to mortgage investment.It also
stems from decisions by most life insurance companies to acquire out-of-
state mortgages through such locally owned independent companies
rather than through their own branch offices or subsidiaries.
Characteristics of the structure and operations of mortgage companies
in the first postwar decade may be briefly summarized:
1. The unusual growth of mortgage companies is seen in the doubling
of their number and tenfold increase in assets from $160 million to $1.8
billion between 1945 and 1955. Further evidence is expansion of mortgage
servicing business to about $20 billion by the end of 1955, three times the
mid-1951 volume. Their servicing volume covered two-thirds of home
mortgages and four-fifths of federally underwritten loans held by life
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insurance companies, savings banks, and FNMA (principal purchasers of
loans from mortgage companies).
2. The concentration of mortgage company activity in federally under-
written mortgages is shown by data for 1953—1955; 90 per cent of loans
closed and 75 to 80 per cent of loans held by surveyed companies were
VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured. Of their conventional loans, the bulk
were on one- to four-family properties.
3. The financial of mortgage companies is relatively simple,
their assets consisting largely of mortgage and construction loans and their
liabilities of notes payable to banks.The dependence of mortgage
companies on commercial banks is indicated by the fact that in most years
close to 90 per cent of mortgage inventory was financed through interim
commercial bank loans.
4. According to rough estimates postwar mortgage banking has been
very profitable—return on net worth amounting to about 15 per cent in
1955, a rate slightly higher than that of sales finance companies and much
higher than that of commercial banks.
5. The mortgage banking industry is young. More than one-half of all
FHA-approved mortgage companies were incorporated in the postwar
decade, and about one-fourth since 1950.
6. In their relationships with borrowers and investors, most mortgage
companies closed at least 90 per cent of their loans only after receiving
firm commitments from institutional investors.
Market Characteristics and Techniques
The techniques that characterize mortgage market operations have
evolved in response to the special needs of the real estate and construction
industries, to the changing character of institutional operations, to the
effects of monetary and fiscal policies, and to shifts in capital market
conditions. One basic characteristic, inherent in the mortgage lending
process and in the construction and real estate activity underlying it, is
the time lag between commitments to invest and the actual acquisition of
mortgages—usually longer and more uncertain than those in other areas
of the capital market. One reflection of this characteristic is the sub-
stantial lag in mortgage interest rate changes behind those of other capital
market securities (Chapter 4). Another is the lag in changes in mortgage
flows behind changes in market conditions several months earlier—an
observation essential to interpretation of data on mortgage finance.
Fundamental to mortgage market operations is use of the commitment
technique in acquiring loans. This technique has become an increasingly
21PLAN OF THE BOOK AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
important part of the mortgage investment process, as institutional
investors have become the major suppliers of mortgage funds.In the
basic commitment technique—a promise to provide mortgage credit
under specified terms and conditions—modifications have been developed
in the postwar decade in response to capital market stringency. The main
innovations have been the "forward" and "standby" commitments.
The forward commitment—used chiefly by life insurance companies—is
an arrangement for disbursing funds within a specified future time,
rather than upon the completion of mortgages.It provides a more
regularized flow of funds over years of intermittent capital market ease
and stringency. The standby commitment comes into wide use only when
regular take-out or forward commitments cannot be had. It is given at a
price so far below the market price that neither lender nor borrower
expects to complete the transaction.Each expects that before the
scheduled disbursement of funds regular commitments will become
available at current market prices. The standby commitment is important
to builders and mortgage originators as an assurance of a source of
permanent long-term funds.It is desired by investors mainly because
of the fees associated with it.
From the standpoint of market participants arid market processes both
advantages and disadvantages derive from the standby commitment
technique. An advantage to the builder is that he can proceed with
construction. An advantage to the originator is that he can maintain or
increase his volume of business. An advantage to the investor is that he
earns a fee for only a promise to lend. Market processes profit from the
technique, in that construction can proceed during periods of temporary
credit stringency and that a pool of completed mortgages can be created
ready for immediate delivery to investors.Disadvantages of standby
commitments to market participants accrue only if anticipated easing
of credit conditions fail to develop.Builders may then incur costs for
credit substantially higher than planned, and lenders may find their
resources taxed by unexpected calls upon them to honor their commitments.
From the standpoint of market processes, disadvantages may be instability
encouraged by expansion in construction to unsustainable levels and
creation of mortgages that cannot be readily absorbed by long-term
investors.
Accompanying postwar innovations in commitment techniques was the
development of variations in commercial bank interim financing under the
broad category of "warehousing." They involved mainly lengthening
of loan maturities and adapting old techniques to new types of borrowers.
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Like commitment innovations, these variations evolved to overcome
temporary shortages of long-term funds and to meet the changing needs
of long-term investors.Common to all variations of warehousing is
the use of interim bank credit pending the availability of long-term
permanent mortgage funds. The collateral for interim loans is usually
mortgages, but on occasion interim loans are made in conjunction with
construction loans and standby commitments.While throughout the
postwar decade mortgage companies have remained the dominant user
of warehousing credit, occasional dramatic uses of such credit have been
made by life insurance companies that have become temporarily over-
committed in mortgages relative to expected cash inflows.
One indication of the significance of interim financing is provided by
rough estimates showing that in 1955—the peak year of its use—com-
mercial bank interim credits were associated with the financing of perhaps
one-third of all new houses built and purchased that year.If assumed
(as evidence allows) to be used only with FHA and VA mortgages,
warehousing may have been involved in about one-half the volume of
federally underwritten mortgages written on new houses in 1955.Like
innovations in commitment techniques, variations and broadened usage
of warehousing credits provided by commercial banks may have salutary
or harmful effects on market processes, depending on conditions. There
is little doubt that the regular short-term interim credit serves a useful
purpose in bridging the gap between closing mortgage loans and their
sale to investors. The harmful unstabilizing effects arise from excessive
use of short-term bank credit in lieu of unavailable long-term funds.
Primary and Secondary Mortgage Markets
The relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets
is unique among capital market sectors. It derives from special institutional
arrangements and techniques of mortgage loan origination and investor
acquisition.Itis upon the clear differentiation of the processes of
mortgage origination and ultimate investment that the distinction between
primary and secondary mortgage markets is drawn.
Mortgage market participants would regard a secondary market trans-
action as one in which, for example, a life insurance company acquired a
mortgage originated by a mortgage company. Such a definition clearly
rests upon the technique of mortgage acquisition and upon the separation
of the origination and investment processes between two different types
of institutions. Almost all the information available on mortgage origin-
ations and purchases is based on this concept. In other financial markets,
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secondary transactions are generally regarded as market trading in existing
securities as distinct from primary transactions in which new debt or equity
instruments are createçl.If the second concept is applied to home mort-
gage markets, the estimated dollar volume of secondary transactions would
probably be no greater than 10 per cent of primary market activity by the
end of the first postwar decade. Under the broader concept commonly
accepted in mortgage markets, secondary transactions would be relatively
much greater.
Under any concept, a secondary market for mortgages scarcely existed
before the Federal Housing Administration was established in 1934. Lack
of uniformity or standardization in loan contracts, property appraisals,
and borrower evaluation limited mortgage transactions to individual local
primary markets.Shifting mortgages among investors was difficult and
expensive—and risky. The FHA mortgage insurance program endowed
federally underwritten mortgages with a degree of quality and uniformity
needed to make them broadly shiftable among investors, and reduced
geographic barriers to investment. Standardization of mortgage terms and
of property and borrower appraisal techniques reduced the need for close
lender supervision and for investigation of individual transactions. A
secondary mortgage market in federally underwritten mortgages took
shape and expanded.
At the same time, changes in primary market transactions were taking
place as large-scale production and sale of houses expanded. In many
instances, the traditional individual transaction between mortgagor and
lender was replaced by mass mortgage transactions between builders and
investors on behalf of numerous unknown house buyers and ultimate
mortgagors.The individualnegotiation process between mortgage
borrower and lender, however, remains an important characteristic of
primary market transactions.
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